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1. *fl most ghastly and helpless state*1
The story begins with a corpse. Early in the New Year of 1922,
Mr Larsen, the Station Master at Izingolweni in southern Natal,
found a youth travelling 'in a most helpless and pitiful
condition...quite unable to walk when taken out of the train'.2
Izingolweni was a small station, opened less than a decade
before, on a single track, narrow gauge line snaking through the
hills inland from Port Shepstone. The line was built largely to
open a transport route for agricultural produce from the still
isolated districts of southern Natal. It was, however, the
closest Natal station to Pondoland and rapidly became the
railhead for migrant workers draining from the Transkeian
Territories.3
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The boy stated that he came from Messrs. Reynolds' Sugar Estate
and was bound for Lusikisiki (a distance of 1OO miles from
Izingolweni). This boy was conveyed by wheelbarrow to a hut
situate on hotel property which is generally used by natives
recruited in Pondoland. [The] hotel proprietor was kind enough to
attend and feed • the boy but despite this attention the
unfortunate lad died...and was buried same day.4
Faka, the 'unfortunate lad', was severely emaciated. All he had
was his travelling pass, a cloth and 7/6 in silver; he was about
fourteen years old.
s n
Larsen was sufficiently perturbed to take a photograph and
report the incident to the nearest Magistrate at Harding. Faka
was by no means the first; 'natives are continually arriving at
Izingolweni station from various Sugar Estates in a state of
collapse and frequently die within a few hours after arrival'.3
The Magistrate at Harding saw no urgent cause for action and
subsequently 'lost' most of the correspondence about this and
other incidents.
By September 1922, Larsen could no longer cope with the dead
and dying at the station. He had handed the responsibility over
to the police in the shape of Lance Sergeant Swarz, commander of
the local Moguntia post. In October and November Swartz found
himself little more than an undertaker. In one two day spell he
dealt with four corpses, including 'a male native lying dead in
an old hut on the hotel premises' and another 'in the act of
dying in the waiting room'.* Tired and disturbed, Swartz sent a
detailed report to his superiors. Local people attempted to
avoid the -corpses. The Deputy Commissioner of Police for Natal,
under the impression that some virulent infectious disease had
broken out, slapped a quarantine notice on the police post.
The district Surgeon was eventually called in to hold post-
mortems (copies of which were also subsequently lost by the
Magistrate).7 It was not least this involvement of the
Department of Health that set bureaucratic wheels spinning more
rapidly. A joint departmental Committee was appointed to sit in
March 1923. Dr. J. Park Ross, Assistant Health Officer for the
Union (Natal) was the driving force behind it and he was more
prone than the magistrate to a little detective work. Deaths
were difficulty to quantify but the Committee examined the
records of 25 cases of people who died at Izingolweni in. 1922,
there were many other deaths in early 1923, on the fields
themselves, or further along the routes into Pondoland.
It is not clear what disease killed Faka and why he did not use
his last 7/6 to buy food. But the Committee found no sudden
spread of infectious disease amongst these migrant workers
returning from the sugar fields. It found scurvy, tuberculosis,
pneumonia, dysentry, some "heart disease' and silicosis or
phthisis. Park Ross emphasised that at least some of these
diseases were preventable by basic regulation and improvement of
the housing, diet and medical facilities available to workers on
the sugar fields. Many workers fell ill, some shortly after
arrival on the estates, either because of the inadequate diet and
conditions or because these exacerbated existing problems.
To keep ill workers on the fields, even if they were not being
paid (and they were not), cost money. The workers' contracts,
where they had them, specified that they would receive free
medical attention. But the estates perceived themselves to be
under acute financial pressure and the tendency was to work sick
workers for as long as possible and then dispatch them home as
quickly as possible when they became incapable. Sick workers
were usually given a cursory medical examination before being
despatched to Izingolweni. Reynolds Bros at Sizela and Crookes
at Renishaw, from where most of the 1922/23 cases came, could
then argue that once workers were certified fit to travel, the
estates' responsibility ended. The doctor in question argued,
when examined by the Committee, that 'that due regard must be
given to the economic side of the question*. Not all officials
in Natal were as incurious as the Magistrate of Harding as to
what was happening; they had relatively little power to
intervene. But as Frank Brownlee, the old Transkeian magistrate,
put it a few years later: 'the people in Natal regard natives
generally from a different point of view to what we do. They are
more harsh towards the Native'.°
The Committee made a number of recommendations for the
improvement of diet, conditions and medical facilities on the
estates and for routine medical examinations before recruitment
and before workers travelled home. Park Ross attempted to use
the episode to embarrass the estates into immediate reforms.
Both he and many Transkeian officials advocated the extension of
the Native Labour Regulation Act (15 of 1911), which controlled
the system of migrant labour in the mining industry, to the sugar
estates as well. In addition to health regulations, it was the
control of youth and child labour which they felt to be the most
urgent need. Poor Faka was by no means the only youth who ran
into difficulties on the sugar estates at this time.
But for the next two decades reforms were systematically
blocked. Conditions on at least some of the sugar estates were a
recurrent cause for concern; officials saw the Rand mines as
more favourable places to work despite the rigours of underground
labour, huge compounds and the social problems which attended
these. When people less sympathetic to the sugar industry
penetrated into the world of the cane fields they found what they
considered a variety of suppressed scandals. The death of
fourteen year old Faka at Izingolweni in 1922 perhaps reflected
some of the worst excesses, but it can be seen as symptomatic of
a system of employment which persisted for many years afterwards.
2. 'A seriousness quite beyond their grasp'.*
Sugar cane, wherever it has been grown on a large scale for
export, has been a crop hungry for labour. Unless cane is milled
shortly after harvest, it loses its sucrose content rapidly;
investment in processing works near the cane fields was
essential. Once such investments had been made, producers had to
find enough cane for continuous operation of the mill during the
harvest season (in South Africa from May to December). Sugar
cane production, which necessarily involved close co-ordination
between agricultural and industrial processes, put a premium on a
steady and controlled labour supply during part of the year, but
also the capacity to diminish the work-force rapidly in the off-
season .
Sugar cane has been at the core of coercive labour systems
demanding a great deal of 'human blood, sweat and gall'.10 After
the abolition of slavery, plantations expanded within the British
empire on the basis of indentured wage workers in such diverse
sub-tropical colonies as Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Queensland
and Natal.x± The Empire's impoverished, recruited especially in
the Indian subcontinent, became part of a population movement
less brutal or final than the slave trade but nevertheless one
with important and varied implications.
The impetus for the importation of indentured labour in Natal
was shaped initially by the success with which local African
communities could resist demands for labour even after conquest.
Migrants recruited from afar on long contracts, from both India
and Mozambique, came to be seen as a more reliable and
controllable labour force for the estates than farm tenants,
daily (togt) labourers or short—term migrants from Natal's many
small locations. The age of Indian indentures was, however,
relatively shortlived. By the time of Union, political
conditions in India, in South Africa and in Britain made the
large-scale organised decantation of Asian workers unpalatable to
many different interest groups.
Intercontinental labour migration had been pursued because some
of the nineteenth century plantations had been enclaves in
colonial possessions where the indigenous population had either
been displaced or was as yet relatively independent. The
processes of conquest and incorporation were more complete in
southern Africa by 1911 when Indian indentured immigration was
halted. Natal and Zululand were the obvious areas for estate
owners to turn and some local workers were secured. But better
paid employment on the Rand and in Durban attracted local workers
away from the fields; employers were also reluctant to 'fall back
on a man who could not be depended on to work for more than a
month of two at a time'.15* A secure source of long-contract
migrants was still favoured. The great majority of workers from
southern Mozambique had, however, switched by the 1890s to the
gold mines of the Transvaal where they formed by far the largest
element in the underground work force.13 Estate owners foresaw
a major labour crisis.
The 1913 Indian workers' strike, perhaps the largest and most
successful that there has ever been on the Natal sugar fields,
fulfilled the estate owners' worst predictions.1-'* Empowered by
their employers' difficulties, angry at the harsh demands made on
them, field workers brought production to a halt. The haemmorage
of Indian workers after the strike was not as rapid as estate
owners feared partly because wage rates were pushed up. But many
of those doing field work melted away.
Exposed to the cold winds of competition, the instinct of
colonial planters was to turn to the state.19 They wanted to
maintain and extend restrictions on mine recruiting in Natal and
Zululand in order to bottle up the domestic labour supply. And,
as in times of difficulty in the nineteenth century, they looked
north — now to the area beyond 22 degrees latitude which
included most of Rhodesia and Mozambique besides the mine-
dominated south.1* The Natal Coast Labour Recruiting Corporation
was established in 1916 primarily to exploit this potential
supply. Well-organised in local groups, as well as
representative bodies such as the Natal Sugar Association and the
two Planters Unions of Natal and Zululand, sugar growers and
millers were determined not to be caught flat-footed by shifts in
government policy again.
But recruitment for the mines in these 'tropical' areas had
been halted in 1713 because of high death rates from pneumonia.
Despite applying maximum pressure, agricultural enterprises such
as the sugar estates could not get more than occasional
exemptions from the restrictions.17- The government was also
reluctant to sanction the bottling up of labour in Natal.
Pritchard, the Director of Native Labour, saw his priority as the
mining industry. Cape officials with liberal inclinations,
particularly Secretaries of Native Affairs Dower and Barrett,
were still an important influence and they deployed the discourse
of a free market in labour; they also displayed some concern
about the conditions under which workers lived and worked. They
felt that the large potential labour supply within Natal could be
mobilised if adequate wage rates were paid by estate owners.
On the one hand the Natal employers say that the Natives are too
lazy to work. On the other hand they complain that the Natives
are freely recruited to work at mine rates which they cannot
afford to pay... The whole truth of the matter is that the large
employer of labour in Natal for years past has mainly got his
labour under conditions approaching those of servility. The
source of this supply is in fact not now available. As a result
it is up to him to put his "house in order" and in future cater
to the local supply.1"
These official protestations should not be taken to imply that
they had the power to impose their ideals. By 1918, the
government had sanctioned restrictions on recruiting by outside
enterprises in some Natal and Zululand districts.
Officials were even less successful in regulating conditions of
employment which they felt would both assure a labour supply to
the fields and safeguard minimum standards in what they saw as
becoming a semi—industrial sphere. The Native Labour Regulation
Act of 1911 was an obvious and immediately available means to
impose control but only applied to designated industrial labour
districts. Labour relations on the great majority of farms, most
of which still operated through systems of tenancy, precluded the
8extension of such regulations to agriculture; nor would farmers
have allowed such a measure to be passed. Sugar planters were
investigating possible supplies of settled African family labour
to replace Indians. But they primarily aimed to extend the use
of African migrant workers - leading a trend which was to become
more general in large-scale capitalist farming enterprises. The
planters' associations nevertheless insisted on their
'agricultural' status. Estate owners throught that regulation of
recruitment and conditions under the 1911 Act would lead to
prohibitive expenses.
It was Transkeian workers who partly resolved the problems of
the estates from the late 1910s. One of the key early recruiters
involved was Douglas Mitchell, later Administrator of Natal and
long serving conservative United Party MP, who became involved in
the Natal Coast Recruiting Corporation as a young man. The
family farm in southern Natal was beyond the sugar belt; trading
and recruiting was a lucrative alternative. Known to workers as
'Ubejana', the rhino, because of his quick temper and
impenetrable hide, his local connections in the densely populated
region of southern Natal and Pondoland provided a network along
which to mobilise supplies. By 1923, when the deaths at
Izingolweni were investigated, there were probably 2-3,OOO
workers from Pondoland in Natal; by 1930 the number had increased
to perhaps 7,000 out of about 30,000 f ieldworkers.1<p An
increase in the local supply within Natal and Zululand, coupled
with some migrants from Mozambique, provided most of the rest of
the field labour force.
Specific economic difficulties helped to push more people from
Pondoland onto the labour market at this time. Influenza cut a
swathe through the rural population in 1918 leaving some
homesteads both short of agricultural labour and wages; the
post-First World War inflationary spiral hit any homestead
dependent on some wage income hard. Mine recruiting slowed around
the early 1920s when the industry was in crisis. But there were
also features of labour on the sugar fields which helped assure
the estates of a longer term supply. Some able-bodied workers
went to the fields rather than the mines, despite lower wages,
because of the availability of above ground work, the relatively
short (six as opposed to nine month) contracts offered, and the
advance system.20 Estate owners railed against advances because
they facilitated desertion, but there is no doubt that their
availability from sugar recruiters, following their abolition by
the Native Recruiting Corporation, was a major factor in
attracting workers from Pondoland.
But the sugar fields also came to rely for some of their supply
on two pools of workers from Pondoland unavailable to the mines
precisely because of the lack of state control. One group were
workers rejected by the mines on the grounds of health. This is
why a few of those who died at Izingolweni in 1922 and 1923 had
miners' phthisis contracted on the Rand. Another were youths
and children.ai Many estates were desperate for labour in the
late 1910s and 1920s: they welcomed youths, the sick and the
lame. Some estates were prepared to dispense with them as soon as
they became unproductive.
3. 'The opposition of the Sugar Planters has always defeated
State intervention in some spheres and the lack of it in others
proved of some significance in resolving the labour crisis on the
estates at this time. But officials in some departments were
uneasy about the system that had come into being and had been so
clearly exposed by the 1923 Committee. They persisted in their
struggle for control during the interwar years.
The lack of uniformity amongst sugar producers was one major
10
problem which they encountered. The large miller/planter
concerns such as Tongaat, Natal Estates, Crookes and Reynolds,
which both grew and milled cane, were sometimes prepared to
consider reform. But there were many smaller—scale white
planters with no milling facilities; because of their numbers
they were not without influence. This applied especially to the
Zululand planters whose estates had been carved out in the
coastal areas in the first decade of the century. They were most
marginal producers and most vehement in blocking any reform which
implied expense.
The political power of the planters and millers, perhaps
becoming the most organised agricultural interest in the country,
was considerable. With the exception of the departments of
Native Affairs Department and Health, the state's major concern
in relation to the sugar industry was not labour, but production,
prices and marketing. During and after the First World War,
increased emphasis was placed in national policy on self
sufficiency in basic staples; up to that time, South Africa,
while exporting a wide range of pastoral products, had been a net
importer of food, including sugar. The sugar growers were able
to negotiate successive measures to protect themselves against
the import of Mauritius and Mozambique sugar.33 In 1926, the
Fahey conference agreement helped to resolve conflicts within the
sugar industry; at the same time the import duty on sugar was
almost doubled from L4/10/- to L8 a ton. In 1932, when prices
fell in the depression, it was doubled again, although the
government imposed a maximum local price. The 1936 Sugar Act,
passed after complex and protracted negotiations, extended very
considerable powers to the sugar producers to regulate their own
industry, including production quotas and prices subject to the
maximum local price stipulated by the government.
These various supports played a considerable part in allowing
the rapid expansion of production in the intei—war years despite
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international price fluctuations, uncertain weather, and locusts
in 1933. Production nearly quadrupled from about 126,000 tons in
1918 to a little under 600,000 tons in 1940. (Table 1) Between
1918 and 1932, both production and the area cultivated doubled
thus enormously increasing the demand for labour. Sugar was one
of the first agricultural commodities, with wine, to receive such
systematic support and regulation. By 1939, the cost of
protecting sugar production was estimated to be higher in
absolute terms (at L2.3 million a year) than any other commodity
although sugar ranked only seventh, by value, amongst those
produced by white farmers (after meat, wool, maize, fruit, milk,
and wheat ).'="•
*"> M
ip'mm^s
' I D iir;
It may appear an anomaly that sugar, a commodity produced very
largely by English-speaking estate owners, not Afrikaner farmers,
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absorbed so disproportionate a share of the state revenue which
underwrote agricultural expansion in these years. The political
processes and mechanisms underlying this transfer require further
historical analysis. Part of the explanation has to do with the
concern by the state to maintain national self-sufficiency and
expand agricultural exports; if sugar cost relatively more to
support because of the highly competitive international market,
it was nevertheless seen as essential to do so. Part had to do
with the significance accorded sugar as an item of consumption.
The complex financial arrangements underlying subsidies, based on
tariff protection rather than direct grants or price supports,
perhaps disguised their extent. Sugar producers also benefited
from the more general political support for agricultural
subsidies. In 1926, the Amalgamated Growers Union affiliated
with the South African Agricultural Union. Although Malan's
Nationalist party criticised the 1936 Act as favouring sugar
above the more essential staples such as maize, it did not
oppose it.
Moreover, it is important to remember that the South African
Party and the United Party, which most sugar producers supported,
were in power for more than half the interwar period. Natal was
a significant source of support as Afrikaners drifted away but
also had separatist tendencies. There were some powerful
lobbyists for sugar interests in parliament throughout this
period, particularly G. Heaton Nicholls, the tireless, articulate
and ruthless planter MP from Zululand. He was an important force
within the SAP/United Party and highly influential in the
numerous negotiations and debates.23 He fought for the benefit
of the industry as a whole but aimed always to protect its
weakest link - the Zululand growers. His support for segregation
policy, of which he became a major protagonist and ideologue,
provided the basis for cross-cutting political alliances.
Growers and millers also benefitted from their anomalous
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position in relation to state legislation and the bureaucracy.
While both the field workers and the African mill workers were
deemed to be agricultural workers and thus unprotected even by
the Native Labour Regulation Act (the position in the mills
changed in 1937), sugar producers as a whole fell under what
became the Department of Commerce and Industry. This was the
state department most skilled and knowledgeable about markets,
finance and the intricacies of protection, which was
simultaneously being developed for South Africa's infant
manufacturing plants. The anomaly caused producers no
embarrassment and gave them considerable advantage.
Complaints about conditions on the sugar fields were frequent
in these years of rapid expansion; they came not least from
within the government itself, and more particulary from the
Transkeian magistrates. ="• Bills were drafted and came close to
being debated. But sugar interests either refused outright to co-
operate or adopted delaying tactics. Heaton Nicholls, for
example, offered a new version of the Masters and Servants Act
in the late 1920s, which would give some discretionary power to
officials to intervene, in order to head off the 1911 Act. This
was rejected by officials. Official attempts to establish a
hospital scheme on the estates also foundered. Sugar interests
argued that any change in the sugar industry would imply change
in the conditions governing agricultural employment as a whole.
Ministers were not prepared give the NAD officials the authority
to push legislation. The NAD was having to become more attuned
to the demands of agrarian interests in the country and in
Parliament. As an official in Pretoria in 1934 despairingly
commented they 'frequently urged legislation' but "the opposition
of the sugar planters has always defeated us', 2 7
While the bureaucracy as a whole was relatively powerless, the
intransigence of the sugar producers and ministers brought out
divisions within the Native Affairs Department — and between the
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NAD and other departments,- over the need for regulation. It was
the NAD in the Transkei had to pick up the administrative pieces
of the sugar estates' excesses: to cope with unlicensed
recruiters, underage recruiting, the policing of deserters, and
those repatriated penniless and sick. The Transkeian General
Councils also consistently represented the plight of sugar
workers to higher authority.as In the extensive and revealing
correspondence on these issues, there is a definite sense of
impatience amongst Transkeian officials with their Natal brethren
who seemed too readily to understand the needs of the sugar
industry; with their colleagues in the Department of Native
Labour whose Inspectors were so powerless outside industrial
districts; and with Head Office in Pretoria which engaged in
shameless delaying tactics throughout the 1930s in order to evade
giving any answer to the frequent representations of the Chief
Magistrate of the TranskEi.a* It is difficult to know just how
important this question was in both reflecting and causing the
changing balance of power in the Native Affairs Department, but
the Transkeian magistrates sometimes seemed to be treated with
the kind of bureaucratic disrespect and delay that might usually
be reserved for another department or even outsiders.30
i
Thus the issue of control over child labour, conditions and
health on the estates was batted around between enquiries by the
Native Affairs Commission (1932), the CNC Natal (1934) and
another Departmental Committee (1935) for investigation.31
Decisions were then set aside until the Native Farm Labour
Committee of 1937-1939 could investigate and report; it did so
finally in 194O and recommended exactly what sections of the NAD
had been fighting for over two decades: the extension of Native
Labour Regulation Act 15 of 1911 both to sugar estates and
mills.33
Under the Native Law Amendment Act of 1937, however, the NAD did
succeed in extending some industrial legislation to places of
15
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employment outside proclaimed labour districts where machinery
was being used. This included the sugar mills which employed
about one seventh of the workers on the estates as a whole. The
fieldworkers and cane cutters from Pondoland were not directly
affected, but this measure was to have some important
implications for the future, providing a handle for unions which
coalesced on the estates during the Second World War.
4. 'These People, as far as I can Imagine, think they are merely
acting in the ordinary course of business': youth and child
labour on the estates and in the reserves.
Faka, as mentioned above, was by no means the only fourteen
year old from Pondoland who worked in Natal in the inter—war
years. Through much of the twentieth century there have been
recurrent exposes about youth and child labour on South African
farms in general. NAD officials and African rural communities
expressed concern at least from the 1910s. Occasionally this and
related issues were taken up and publicised more broadly: for
example, by the Transkeian General Council, the SA Institute of
Race Relations and churches in the 1930s, by the Communist Party
and a couple of Unions in the 1940s; and in the ANC paper New
Age and Drum magazine in 1950s. Analysis of the issue is
important not only in understanding the nature of accumulation
on the farms in South Africa, but also the patterns of social
change in the Transkei itself.
Under the 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act, the mines were
forbidden to contract youths under the age of eighteen. This
measure was not uniformly and consistently imposed, but the
number of employees under this age diminished. Loosely applied
as it was, the restriction was acceptable to the mining industry
which needed, for the most part, men who were sufficiently
physically mature to cope with the demands of underground labour.
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Officials approached the mining industry with the model of
Victorian reforms in mind; experience of high death and
desertion rates in the early years of mining provided further
impetus for control.
The 18 year minimum age for recruits was in fact high by the
standards of industrial legislation. Indeed both farmers and
of.ficials recognised the implications of the Act in protecting
the access of landlords and agricultural employers to youth and
child labour. In 1911, the Chairman of the Natal Sugar
Association calculated that 'taking the ordinary vital statistics
of the world there would be at least 63,000 men between 14 and 18
years of age' available in Natal. The sugar estates would thus
'have a very large number of useful native labourers untouched by
the recruiters from Johannesburg'.33 Restrictions on youth
recruiting, in which agricultural employers did not have to
compete with the mines, were one reason for the sugar estates'
antipathy towards the extension of Act 15 of 1911.
However, officials were not simply attempting to resolve the
competition for labour in the country by sharing out the supply
on the basis of age. The government did promulgate regulations
in the 1910s and 1920s to establish that only youths of 16 and
above could be recruited for agriculture and that parental
permission had to be obtained for the contracts involving 16 to
18 year olds. Officials were not empowered to prevent the
employment of youths under sixteen on farms where parents agreed
to it, nor were they particularly concerned about such
arrangements where they formed part of a tenancy agreement with
parents living on the farm. Undesirable child labour, from the
viewpoint of officials trying to control recruiters, was
construed to mean longer term contracted labour performed away
from home by those under sixteen, or those under eighteen without
parental authority. Child labour was seen to lead to high rates
of desertion, to the erosion of parental and 'tribal' control, to
17
juvenile delinquency and uncontrolled urbanisation.
Underage recruiting proved very difficult to control in these
interwar years, even where officials attempted to do so.
Unscrupulous recruiters contributed to the problem, but its
persistence rested on employers' perceptions that youth and child
labour was useful and economic: either because it was cheaper,
or because it was the only labour obtainable, or because children
were thought to do some tasks better. Indian families had
sometimes worked as a whole on the sugar fields and estate owners
had initially sought to replace some of their Indian workers with
settled family labour.
Underage workers did not usually perform the heaviest work of
cane cutting and loading nor did they work in the mills. But
women or children were seen as adequate for many of the other
tasks such as hoeing, weeding, herding and leaading, oxen used in
large numbers for ploughing, or work around the (still small-
scale) compounds. The very rapid extension of the area under
cultivation in the 1920s put a premium on a cheap supply of
workers for these sorts of tasks.
Although the issue of underage recruiting arose particularly in
relation to the sugar estates and other major agricultural
employers of migrant workers, planters were by no means unique in
recognising the value of youth and child labour in South Africa
at this time. The fact that all African male workers were
insultingly called 'boys' by white employers should not disguise
the reality that a good many outside the mining and industrial
sector were boys or youths in the earlier decades of this
century. In a segregationist era, African children were
perceived in a different light from European children, for whom
education was already compulsory. In Natal, particularly, the
majority of urban domestic servants were African male youths
from about twelve to twenty years of age.3* Child labourers
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from the Transkei Mere used for coal loading in the Durban Docks
in the early 1920s, running up steep gang planks with baskets of
coal. These 'Grimy Imps of the Wharfside', same 'mere picannins
of 12' were presented as 'grubby but happy' and their employment
justified on the grounds of their 'extraordinary agility'.33
If urban employers found a range of roles for youths and
children, this was even more the case in the rural areas. The
practice of absorbing children into domestic and agricultural
labour on farms Mas deeply rooted in both slave and non—slave
systems.3* Labour tenancy was becoming the predominant social
relationship on white-owned farms in the early decades of the
twentieth century and the transfer of the labour of children to
the landlord was part of many such agreements. As on the sugar
fields, herding, domestic service, hoeing and weeding could all
be done by African boys and girls or youths. Masters and
Servants legislation, and court cases testing this, allowed
parents to bind their children under the age of sixteen as part
of a contract for the family as a whole. The Native Service
Contract Act of 1932 entrenched the responsibility of the heads
of African tenant households over the labour of their families as
a whole in a context where both they and white farmers were
finding it increasingly difficult to control the youth. The age
to which fathers could bind their sons in contracts was increased
to IB. The difference between sugar planters and farmers in
general was not that they assumed the availability of African
youth and child labour but that they were employing children from
Pondoland away from home and often without parental permission.
When chiefs and General Councillors in Pondoland began to make
representations and demand action about the recruiting of youths
and children in the 1920s, they tended to blame the sugar
recruiters for contributing to the general breakdown of parental
authority. However, the reminiscences of old men from Pondoland
who worked on the fields do not always recall coercive means of
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recruiting being used. This is not to say that the youths were
happy in their sacks - the usual working apparel on the sugar
fields; rates of desertion were high. But they were not
generally forced to go and work in Natal. Mcetywa Mjomi
recalled.
It was very easy to jDin in those days. Boys ran away from
herding cattle. They were doing it without the permission of
their parents — who were complaining about it. Sugar recruiters
would approach them and would send someone to collect the boys.
They would follow them by night to a certain spot and they would
be taken away early in the morning.3y
An analysis of child labour on the estates must also address the
issues of why youths in Pondoland might have wanted to 'run
away*. Rural poverty, especially in the years after the First
World War, was one side of the equation. But the importance of
child labour in African society and the social stresses within
the homesteads in the Transkei were another.3B
Control of the labour of male children and youths was as
significant in the African reserves and amongst African
sharecroppers as it was on the farms. The critical task of
herding was very largely entrusted to boys and youths under
eighteen and usually under sixteen. In this sense, emergent
capitalist agriculture incorporated elements of the established
local division of labour. Pre-capitalist and peasant labour
relationships were embedded in broader kin relationships and in
an ethic which made them part of socialising processes. Herding
for boys involved education about the natural world and about
custom, the formation of friendship networks, and the learning of
fighting skills. The pace of work was also very much shaped and
determined by the social practices of the youth: there was time
for enjoyment. Work was part of a domestic environment,
supervised by family members and not an impersonal wage
relationship.
Clearly, the notion of 'work' used in describing wage labour
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relationships is inadequate to capture that in pre-capitalist or
even peasant communities. Nevertheless, herding was work which
demanded considerable skills, entailed responsibility, and could
involve hardship. It is not necessary to accept views of African
society which see the division of labour within the pre—colonial
homestead as constituting class exploitation in order to make
this point.^^ Cattle and sheep sometimes had to be taken long
distances to suitable pasture or water; they had to be defended;
animals had to be kept from fields during the growing season from
October to May. Punishment, including violent punishment, could
be meted out to herds who let their animals into fields.
It is also important not to see the division and nature of
labour in African communities as static, particularly not in the
early decades of the twentieth century. Patterns of crop
production and stock-keeping, as well as the entrenchment of
migrant labour, altered the nature and division of labour in the
homesteads. Conflict between fathers and children in many
peasant societies develops not least because the whole family has
to work and the family, rather than other social insitutions,
has to socialise youths into their duties.
There is some evidence to suggest that labour demands on boys
and youths in Pondoland were increasing at the time when child
labour became prevalent on the sugar estates. The primary reason
for this was the rise in the number of animals in the area. In
1912/13 East Coast fever, a tick-borne disease, had decimated the
herds. When dipping became effective, the number of cattle in
Pondoland increased at a enormous rate from well under 100,000 in
1915, to about their pre-ECF level of 250,000 in 1923/24 and to
over 500,000 by 1930. The number of sheep also increased nearly
threefold to over 550,000 in the two decades before the drought
of the early 1930s. Because of the growing numbers of animals
and the declining quality of the pasture, stock had to be taken
further each day (and returned to kraals at night) for grazing.
21
They had to be kept from the cultivated fields, the number and
density of which were also increasing. And th^s was the very
time at which youths and even children were beginning to migrate
to work, thus throwing more responsibility on the younger herders
who stayed behind. While patterns of herding were flexible in
relation to the numbers of animals that could be handled, the
scale and pace of the increase involved not only presented a
major — and often noted — ecological problem but also a labour
problem.
Nor were African communities unstratified. Some homesteads had
few or even no cattle. This was seldom a permanent state in
Pondoland in these years, in that cattle could be loaned from
wealthier families or bought with wage income. Nevertheless,
there were always some families whose boys would herd for others
rather than working for their own homesteads. In earlier years
this would usually involve an exchange of labour, often between
kin, for the loan of animals. By the intei—war years, there
could be a payment or at least the expectation of it. Larger
stock owners, who sometimes had hundreds of animals and were
reluctant to loan all of these out under the nooma system, would
need to employ people on a more regular basis. Some European
traders in the reserves had become large stock owners who also
employed youths to herd for them. Thus herds within the Transkei
itself were no longer always working for their own homesteads and
the payment they received for themselves (a goat or a sheep worth;
less than ten shillings for three months) or a loan animal for
their families, seldom amounted to what they could earn away from
home.
It is not easy to get at the changing nature of herding through
the oral material because the experience is part of a social
memory of childhood. This tends to be expressed in romantic
terms - justifiably so in the sense that the 1920s and 1930s were
a period when cattle stocks were high and rural society in the
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Transkei far more independent. But the tension of the
relationship is expressed in contemporary documents.
I know of two boys from my location who ran away and were
recruited by a trader in the Lusikisiki district...They went off
to a certain kraal and got the kraal-head to come and
impersonate their parents and they paid him something for doing
this. In this way those two boys went off to the Sugar estates.
Me require our boys to herd our stock and yet they can run away
from us by doing this.*0
A number of men interviewed used the expression that they "ran
away from herding' or from school around this time.
I had to hide away because I was running away from school...I
though I'd be rich in no time if I left school and went to work.
When I arrived there [Tongaat], I had to clean the stables where
the mules were kept. I liked that work because it was not hard.
When I returned my father was angry.*1
This was not the only set of circumstances that drove youths
onto the sugar estates: boys could go to work to earn money for
education which their parents denied; fathers could send their
children to earn money or a cattle advance; in one case, a
father sent his fourteen and twelve year old sons to complete a
contract when he fell ill. (They deserted).*3 But it does seem
that the demands on youths were being intensified at the same
time as options broadened. Many white farmers, African tenants
and homestead heads tended to assume that child labour, in
different forms, was available for use. The question was who was
going to have access to it and under what conditions.
Notions of pre-industrial or peasant child labour should not be
equated with industrial child labour. Ideas about what
constituted childhood were themselves being reformulated by both
whites and blacks. Segregationist ideas allowed distinctions to
be made in the dominant society between African children and
white children; these gave rise to considerable unease amongst
some officials, and reformist whites and blacks. But African
child and youth labour was being moulded into a more capitalist
23
context from a base where it was widely assumed by many of the
parties involved that African children should work.
In this as in many other respects, it is possible to argue that
the labour practices of emerging capitalist economy in South
Africca were significantly shaped by the practices, expectations,
conflicts in African communities. Reformers seeking to pursue
what they saw as a more rational view of capitalism were having
to confront rural African perceptions as well as the excesses of
employers in these inter—war years. Rural attitudes were
certainly changing as educational possibilities became more
widespread, but the issue was still alive in the post—Second
World War conflicts over rehabilitation and fencing. It should
not be assumed that Transkeian homestead heads opposed child
labour on the sugar fields for the same reasons as did
paternalistic officials or educated African leaders.
5. Postscript - 'In...regard...to the lack of state supervision
over the lawless detribalised natives...the Sugar Industry is
innocent'*3
By the time the South African Sugar Association submitted its
evidence to the Fagan Commission of Enquiry in 1947, when peak-
season field worker numbers had increased to about 50,000, the
leaders of the industry claimed innocence in relation to
disrupting "tribal' society. They had become instead keen
advocates of it — arguing for the full range of policies that
underpinned apartheid:' migrant labour, development of the
reserves, renewal of chieftaincy, restoration of 'tribal'
controls, control of urbanisation. They saw themselves as
making a major contribution to this end.
The seasonal nature of the active operations of the Sugar
Industry make it uneconomic for the full native labour force to
be permanently engaged, and the rotation of life between work and
their homes in the Reserves is complementary...*1*
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These claims seem disturbing in the light of their enormously
disruptive employment practices in the interwar years• But
although youth and child workers continued to be employed on the
fields, it seems that they declined in importance from the late
1930s. The shift in employment practices was again the result of
a complex interaction between changing patterns of production on
the one hand and the way in which rural communities offered their
workers on the other.
Production of cane, it has been mentioned, quadrupled in the
inter—war years. (See table 1, p.11). Whereas the doubling of
production from about 1918 to 1932 was achieved largely by
expanding the area of sugar cane reaped each year, the
spectacular increase from about 1932 to 194O, immediately after
depression, drought and locusts, was achieved with relatively
little expansion in the acreage reaped, but rather through gains
in yield and productivity. Perhaps the major factor in this
development was the change in the type of cane grown.
In the 1880s, Natal planters adopted the Uba variety which was
tough and had a low sucrose content but was hardy and could
withstand disease and drought. By the 1920s, Uba itself was
becoming susceptible to disease and yields were less certain.
Planters turned to new Coimbatore varieties developed in Southern
India which were quicker growing, higher yielding and easier to
cut. In 1935, about 85 per cent of the cane reaped was still
Uba; in the next three seasons this figure declined to about 3O
per cent.*3 Pricing and marketing agreements rewarding high
sucrose content in cane encouraged a rapid switch. Increased
yields coupled with generous state price supports in this period
stimulated simultaneous investment in plant, in fertiliser and in
physical works and contouring on the land.
There was no guarantee that this favourable conjuncture would
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result in rewards for workers. In 1939, the estates refused to
follow many other industries in meeting some of the travel
costs of their migrant workers. As the Social and Economic
Planning Council mentioned, crops such as sugar were being
subsidised not only by the mining industry and producers of other
less protected agricultural commodities, but also by the 'lowly-
paid unskilled workers'.*4 However, the change in the type of
cane put a premium on cutting skills. Moreover, some estate
owners began to perceive that they could save costs by getting
more work out of fit and mature men rather than relying on a
large turnover of less productive workers. By the second half of
the 1930s, bonus systems were being introduced on the leading
estates for every 100lbs. cut over the basic minimum task per
day: usually 3-3,500 lbs of Coimbatore. The standard wage in the
interwar years was about l_2 for a ticket of thirty days, in
contrast to L3 on the mines. This declined in 1932 to between 30
and 35 shillings. But wage rises to L2 in the late 1930s,
coupled with the bonus payments, attracted more mature men back
onto the fields.
Leading estates like Tongaat began to make major reforms in
their employment practices in the 1930s. Credit for these are
claimed for Douglas Saunders who returned from Cambridge
University to take over the Tongaat estate in the late 1920s.•"•
Park Ross of the Department of Health was perhaps more
significant in putting persistent though politic pressure on the
planters over a long period of time. He used what purchase was
given by the Public Health Act to attempt, to enforce some minimum
housing standards; he also drew up and advertised minimum diet
schedules for workers — though these were largely ignored.
Devastating malaria epidemics in the late 1920s and early
1930s also helped to shock the state and planters into further
action.1"' Spreading southwards from parts of Zululand where it
was endemic, malaria.penetrated deep into the North coast sugar
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belt especially in 1929/30 and took the lives of thousands.
Workers from the Transkei and southern Natal, who were hardly
exposed to the disease at home, Mere particularly vulnerable.
Medical officers made a clear link between the rates of death and
the general housing and health conditions in particular
compounds.*** Major estates were brought to a halt for weeks
during the harvest and crushing season. A renewed campaign by
the Department of Health to improve conditions was launched.
But it was only around 1940 that even the leading miller/planter
concerns were meeting the full dietary recommendations of the
Department of Health - to include meat twice a week, citrus and
vegetables as well as a full supply of maize and beer.so
The malaria epidemic also benefited migrant workers from the
Transkei in that the Health Department prevailed on the
government to prevent recruitment from non—malarial zones into
malarial areas such as the Zululand estates. Those estates with
the worst conditions, those most dependent on cheaper labour,
were thus closed to migrants from Pondoland. The government also
reluctantly agreed to maintain some restrictions on mine
recruiting in the sugar districts of Zululand, a measures which
had important implications for Zulu workers.
Shifting employment practices, which were in turn related to
the changing patterns of sugar production on the major estates,
were partly responsible for an apparent decline in some of the
worst features of Transkeian child migration. Estates had often
found youths and children to be particularly troublesome
employees. The prevalence of violence as a means of control on
the sugar fields was in part related to the proportion of sick
workers and young workers unaccustormed to industrial discipline.
Although cheaper than adults, youths seem to have deserted more
frequently; as they were not registered for tax purposes and
their contracts were not always attested by magistrates, they
could be difficult to trace. It was not always disadvantageous
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to dispense with child labour.
There was no legislative guarantee that the improvement in
conditions in the sugar fields would be sustained. There had in
any case been little change on many estates, especially on the
lands of more marginal planters. Moreover, during the 1940s the
sugar estates, following their extraordinary expansion,
experienced slump and uncertainty. Production did not again
exceed the heights of 1940 (nearly 600,000 tons) until 1954.
(Table 1, p. 11) Serious droughts coupled with inflating costs
discouraged further investment and expansion; fertiliser was
difficult to obtain because of the Second World War. The
government also held down the domestic price of sugar, a basic
item for working class consumers, during the inflationary years
of the War and immediately afterwards when industrial militancy
was widespread. The internal market expanded, not least because
a cheaper grade 2 unrefined sugar was produced in large
quantities following the 1936 Sugar Act and the subsequent Sugar
Industry Agreement.31 But producers could not meet their export
quota. Only in 1947 did the government allow a significant
internal price hike as international prices for agricultural
commodities such as sugar rose. The National Party government
then reaffirmed state commitment to an expanded industry,
including exports, at a time when opportunities for sugar
production improved as a whole.
The conditions of the Second World War not only saw the state
acting to protect low-income consumers at a time of industrial
conflict, but planters "were increasingly having to operate in a
highly competetive labour market for migrant workers. Some
workers from Pondoland began to shift away from the mines and
sugar fields towards expanding manufacturing industries. In
this context, sugar workers could assert themselves more
forcefully. Indian workers still predominated in the mills by
the late 1930s when a new phase of trade union organisation
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began.az The Communist Party had recovered from the worst of its
inter—war purges and some key figures in the Indian community
were recruited. Natal Indian industrial workers became perhaps
the most highly unionised segment of the black South African
workforce in the late 1930s and 1940s.
Unionists made extensive use of the industrial legislation
available and their efforts were not confined to Indian workers
alone. The Sugar Industry Employees Union was registered in
1938 under the Industrial Conciliation Act.33 Following the
Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937, African workers in the mills
also qualified as workers under the industrial and wage
legislation. In 1940, the Union approached the Mage Board for
an official investigation of wages and tried to include even
field workers in the process. A protracted dispute followed and
the Labour Ministry under Madeley, reluctant to risk a full scale
strike in a strategic industry during the war — especially with
the additional threat that cane fields might be fired - made an
award to the mill Workers.
Field workers were not included in the agreement, but
employers were correct to fear that any wage rise in the mills
was bound to have repercussions in the fields. The war years
were punctuated by small, dispersed strikes by non—unionised
field workers including those from the Transkei. In 1942 wages
crept up to L2/10/- for thirty tickets on leading estates.
Following the success of the African Mine Workers Union, the
Communist Party extended its organisational commitment to
unskilled migrant workers. In Natal, M.P. Naicker, W. Cele and
others launched a Natal Sugar Field Workers Union which again
attempted to bridge Indian and African workers. In this case,
however, the union had no industrial legislation under which to
operate and received no recognition. The Field Workers Union,
like the Mine Workers, crumbled in the late 1940s. But it did
succeed in publicising conditions on the estates at a sensitive
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period and certainly caused a good deal of official concern.
Such pressures, together with the other longer term shifts in
production methods and conditions of employment, seem to have
limited the reversion to widespread underage recruiting. In the
1950s, when the industry again expanded very rapidly to reach new
heights of production, the system of migrant labour came to
replicate that on the mines more closely.
Important social changes in the rural areas also contributed to
the entrenchment of a less disruptive system of labour migration
from Pondoland. Firstly, if the argument about the relationship
between increasing animals numbers and child labour is correct,
then it must be qualified for the period after the mid-1930s.
Stock numbers fell in the droughts of the early 1930s and
subsequently stabilised. Secondly, school facilities and also
demand for schooling expanded in the 1940s, a process which
accelerated in the 1950s when the introduction of Bantu Education
was accompanied by rapid increases in funding for rural schools.
Thirdly, migration to the cities, especially Durban, by women and
children as well as men became a more general in the Second World
War. Population was actually stable from 1936 to 1946 in some
Pondoland districts.
Youth migration was still strongly encouraged. With official
sanction, a pattern developed whereby many workers would take a
few contracts on the sugar fields between the ages of about 16
and 20. They would then move on to the Rand, or to industries in
Durban, unless the opportunity of upward mobility on the estates
presented itself. But if the worst excesses of child labour had
perhaps been resolved on the sugar fields the same could not be
said of a number of other agrarian contexts in the 1950s.
Analysis of the pattern of employment on the sugar fields in
the period from the 1930s, and of the experience of Transkeian
workers there, suggests some generalisations about the material
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basis of apartheid which need to be tested. Wolpe and Legassick
argued in different ways that one feature of the transition from
segregation to apartheid was the extension of the migrant labour
system from mining to manufacturing industry in order to broaden
the supply of cheap labour. This argument has been contested and
modified in various ways: the pass laws were unevenly applied;
considerable African urbanisation continued; and a highly
differentiated African labour force emerged. Morris has pointed
to the importance of the agrarian labour crisis of the 1940s, as
much as the industrial labour supply, in shaping early policies
of the nationalist government.3*
Perhaps more attention should be focussed on the partial shift
towards migrant labour in agriculture. It is clear that major
elements of the apartheid programme were linked to changing
patterns of agricultural employment.os The significance of this
sector should be neglected for the early apartheid years. In the
period 1945 to 1955 agricultural production grew as a proportion
of the 6DP (9.4 per cent in 1945, 17,8 per cent in 1950, 15.1
per cent in 1955), temporarily reversing a trend in the opposite
direction over the previous and subsequent decades. Systems of
tenancy did persist in many contexts and were sometimes replaced
by wage labour settled on farms. But it was not only on the
sugar estates that a shift to migrant labour, as part of an
overall trend towards wage labour rather than tenancy, took
place. How far the ideology of capitalist farmers reflected the
positions reached by the sugar planters after the Second World
War requires further investigation: it was surely significant in
the elaboration of apartheid.
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